On 1 July 2025, a Bombardier Learjet 45XR (5N-BLW) operated by Flybird Aircraft Management Services departed Cairo for Medina. On board were two pilots, a flight attendant and an engineer. The nose landing gear (NLG) would not retract and the crew returned. After landing on runway 23L, the aircraft veered left and stopped on the paved shoulder. No one was injured and the aircraft was slightly damaged.
Before the Flight
The evening before, the engineer found the No. 4 main wheel tyre deflated. The next day, staff at a local hangar not approved for the type towed the aircraft in for inflation.
The Flight
Between 80 kt and V1, the crew felt a slight lateral bump. When the crew selected the gear up, the NLG stayed down and a "NWS FAIL" (nose wheel steering failure) message appeared. The crew recycled the gear, which toggled for 71 seconds before returning to down. During a low pass, observers reported the nose wheel down but deflected to the left.
The crew declared an emergency and landed on runway 23L, holding the nose off as long as they could. After the nose wheel touched down, the heading changed from 226.4° to 160.5° in 20 seconds. The aircraft stopped 275 m from the touchdown point.
Findings
Two cut seals in the NLG strut had let nitrogen and hydraulic fluid escape. The strut could not extend fully to engage the centring cam. As a result, the nose wheel stayed deflected and the gear could not retract.
The nose wheel steering weight-on-wheels switch was loose, with its safety wire installed backwards. In tests, it did not actuate when the strut was compressed. A false weight-off signal disables steering and leaves the wheel free to caster. With the strut deflated, it could bottom on the fork and reduce castering. This may have made the initial left deflection hard to correct in time.
The same steering failure had occurred on 8 June 2025, when the operator found the switch loose and reinstalled it. The aircraft then flew 43 cycles without a further recorded defect.
Recommendations
1. Restrict access to the aircraft and flight deck during ramp servicing to type-rated personnel.
2. Operators to have qualified, type-rated staff supervise ramp servicing and towing.
3. Crews to deactivate the CVR immediately after a serious incident.
4. Bombardier to consider condition-based criteria for when repeated strut servicing or fluid loss should prompt a seal inspection.
5. Bombardier to clarify alternate towing equipment in AMM Task 09-10-00.
Photo from the official report