On 5 June 2026, an Airbus A321 Neo was being prepared for a flight from Lisbon to London Heathrow, with a scheduled departure time of 04:30.
The aircraft was being handled by a ground team consisting of one Turnaround Team Leader and Equipment Operator (TTAE1) and two Ground Handling Agents (OAE). After completion of loading and boarding activities, TTAE1 was replaced before completing the departure coordination and cockpit communication tasks associated with pushback.
A second employee (TTAE2) began duty at 04:00 and arrived at the aircraft stand at 04:34, at which point he assumed responsibility for the remaining aircraft handling tasks. The aircraft doors were closed and the aircraft was declared ready for pushback. By this time, TTAE1 had already left the stand to other duties.
TTAE2 carried out an external inspection, performed the pushback manoeuvre and removed the nose-wheel steering lock pin. TTAE1 had inadvertently left his cockpit communication equipment (headsets) hanging on the aft-facing nose landing gear door, not detected by TTAE2.
TTAE1 subsequently notified the handling control centre, the ramp supervisor and the duty supervisor. The handling control centre then contacted Air Traffic Control; however, the aircraft had already departed.
Following notification from Lisbon Area Control Centre (ACC), the flight crew reported an unusual noise and elected to divert the aircraft to Porto.
A maintenance inspection revealed remnants of the communication equipment, including loose cables, entangled around the right main landing gear door. No damage was identified to the aircraft structure or systems, and the aircraft was subsequently released to continue its flight to Heathrow.
The ground handling operator in Lisbon conducted an internal investigation and determined that the position of the headsets, which were partially obscured from view, together with the prevailing low-light conditions at the time of departure preparation, contributed to the equipment not being detected by TTAE2.
The investigation highlighted the importance of conducting a thorough aircraft inspection and the strict prohibition against placing any items on an aircraft landing gear. In addition, a Safety Learning Summary (SLS) was published internally, reiterating information previously contained in a Safety Alert issued in September 2025.
The consequences of the event were limited and the flight was able to continue to its destination after maintenance checks carried out in Porto. However, it is important to recognise that the outcome could have been significantly more serious had the headset been ingested by one of the aircraft engines.
Photo Source: BriYYZ, Wikimedia, Creative Commons 2.0

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