On 2 February 2025, United Airlines flight 1382, an Airbus A319 registered N837UA, experienced a contained failure of its right engine during the take‑off roll at Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental Airport. As the aircraft accelerated down runway 15R, but before reaching decision speed (V1), a loud bang was heard in the cockpit, followed by an engine failure indication and a slight yaw to the right. The flight crew immediately initiated a rejected take‑off and brought the aircraft safely to a stop on the runway.
Once stopped, the crew carried out the rejected take‑off checklist and initially instructed passengers to remain seated. However, reports from passengers that there was a fire in the right engine quickly led to confusion and escalating concern in the cabin. Although there was no confirmed fire inside the aircraft, the crew transitioned to the engine fire procedure and requested assistance from airport emergency services.
In the aft cabin, several passengers began shouting about a fire and attempted to leave their seats, retrieving personal belongings despite repeated instructions from the cabin crew to remain seated. The situation rapidly deteriorated as passengers became increasingly anxious and uncooperative. Some moved towards the rear exits, obstructing the aisles and making it difficult for flight attendants to assess conditions or maintain control. The escalating panic, combined with an inability to establish communication with the flight deck, led the aft cabin crew to independently initiate an evacuation.
The evacuation was initiated without activation of the evacuation alarm, resulting in limited awareness on the flight deck. As a result, the aircraft’s left engine was still running when the aft left door (2L) was opened. The evacuation slide deployed but immediately became unstable, twisting violently in the airflow from the operating engine. Despite this, several passengers used the slide before it fully stabilised. Shortly afterwards, the slide deflated and was deemed unusable, forcing the crew to redirect passengers to other exits.
Other exits, including the aft right and forward left doors, were subsequently used for evacuation, and passengers were able to exit the aircraft under the guidance of crew and emergency responders. Throughout the evacuation, many passengers continued to carry baggage, further complicating and slowing the process. Once emergency services confirmed that there was no active fire and the situation was under control, the evacuation was halted to prevent unnecessary risk, and the remaining passengers were later deplaned safely.
The technical investigation determined that the engine failure was caused by the fracture of a high‑pressure compressor blade due to high‑cycle fatigue, a known failure mode. However, the investigation concluded that the most significant risks arose during the evacuation phase rather than from the initial technical failure itself.
The probable cause was identified as the cabin crew’s failure to activate the evacuation alarm and maintain effective communication with the flight crew after deciding to evacuate, which resulted in evacuation actions taking place while an engine was still running. Contributing to the severity of the situation was widespread passenger noncompliance with safety instructions, including standing up prematurely, retrieving baggage, and forcing access to exits.
Overall, the event highlights the importance of coordinated cockpit‑cabin communication, strict adherence to evacuation procedures, and effective management of passenger behaviour during emergency situations.