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SKYbrary Core Team – 2 February 2010 – Eurocontrol Meeting

SKYbrary Website Core Team Meeting – Eurocontrol (EC) – 2 February 2010

CE Meetin Summary

Agenda and Meeting Objectives

Strategic Progress

  • Major organisational and financial changes underway at EC – significant funding review but Skybrary future is agreed for 4 years using the EC Safety budget.
  • Skybrary site hits are now at 1500 to 2500 per day
    • Aviation Safety Network(Dutch) gets more hits,but FSF has far less

Content Development

  • Commercial Air Transport Flt Ops pages are the current development priority
  • ATM and airworthiness content are the next priority targets
  • GA is the least
  • Offshore helicopters may become a new priority, but only if finance can be made available from that area – RJ to investigate potential interest in that market

Content Development Plan Review (current position in %content)

  • Accidents – 65%
  • Air grd comms – 85%
  • Airspace infringement – 65%
    • An infringement action plan is under development at EC
    • The CAA Guide to air/grd comms may be placed on SKB in due course
  • Birdstrikes – 95%
  • CFIT- 95%
  • Fire/smoke/Fumes – 65%
  • Ground Ops – 80%
  • Level bust-100%
  • LOC – 100%
  • LOS – 100%
  • Runway Excursions-75%
  • Runway Incursions – 75%
  • Wake Vortex – 90%
  • Weather – 75%
  • Emergency and contingency – 60%
  • Safety Management – 80%
  • Safety Regulation – 75%
  • Human Factors – new
  • Flight technical – 50%
  • Theory of flight – 70%
  • Airworthiness – 90%
  • General Operational Issues – 31%
  • HE and legal – in draft

SKYBRARY Users Survey

  • 665 Users in 93 States returned surveys
  • Mainly operational staff and trainers plus regulators and airworthiness engineers
  • UK, Spain and Italy major users in EC area – and all experienced in aviation
  • Users are mainly seek personal and professional development
  • Skybrary average usage was 20 minutes per view – once a week
  • Most were seeking well laid out info with user friendly navigation of pages
  • The team felt that more regular user feedback was needed and more work to stimulate user responses was discussed
  • Users are also seeking best practice, education and training material
  • Some seek regulatory advice
  • Several wanted improved visibility of the information available
  • Some concerns expressed about the quality of the information

Telephone Interview Outcomes
Information sought

  • Who are the current users?
  • What is it being used for?
  • Discussion on the way ahead?

Most Popular Pages in priority order

  • Landing Page
  • Aircraft types
  • Accidents and Serious incidents
  • SMS
  • Birdstrikes

User Categories – based on why each Gp consults SKB

  • Gp 1- Keep up my currency and awareness
    • Email highlights are key
    • Send email update regularly on set day and time
    • ATM – Ops related issue regularly monthly
  • Gp 2 – Fast knowledge locator tool
    • Google brings them to Google
    • Strong requirement for credible knowledge
    • Links to credible and comprehensive sources
  • Gp 3 – Encyclopaedia – answer a specific question
    • Event investigation, procedure design, training and research
    • Could we have a checklist to help an investigation to do the analysis and reconstruction
  • Gp 4 – Direct source from which to copy text
    • An internal company safety letter article source
  • Gp 5 – Use it to reference in ICAO documents
    • Full Presentation on User Survey Outcomes (Value Proposition)

Content Management Process Review

  • The current process of article creation and validation process requires review
  • Proposal for new articles is to select a number of Skybrary Fellows who are nominated experts to provide comment and approval for new articles
    • Articles which focus on operational issues to start
    • Fellows can also select individual specialists from within their network
  • Content and Article Process Proposal presentation attached.

Skybrary Forum Development

  • The original aim of the Forum was to engage the audience.
  • To stimulate feedback from the readers and activate the exchange
  • The Team considered that the Forum could add value but the term ‘Forum’ lacked credibility amongst aviation professionals due to other discredited Forums already on the web
    • A Skybrary Forum must not reduce the credibility of the entire site!
  • The method by which successful Feedback is gained from the audience needs to tailored carefully to match the variety of life styles- pilots, engineers, safety, admin staffs
  • The Core Team were asked to carefully review and reconsider the need for a forumer!

New Subject Categories for Consideration

  • Aero medical – several inputs available already!
  • Safety performance
  • Audit programmes
  • Accident investigation techniques
  • Safety data management (data coding, classification)
  • Flight/Cabin crew training

Latest Categories

  • Entry point on left navigation pane – ‘Safety Journals’

Work Priorities for the Coming Year

  • Accident &Serious Incident Section is in backlog, but will be completed shortly followed by HF,AI,RI,F/S/F by year end
  • Review and update current articles lodged on the site
    • A detailed annual review plan is required with target dates for completion to drive the process
  • Enhance internal links within documents and articles
  • A Policy for links to commercial organisations will be required to protect the credibility of the site.

Summary of Discussion from the Meeting
List of Actions from the Meeting

Rich Jones
Chief Executive
UK Flight Safety Committee
9 February 2010

SKYbrary – 20 February 2009 – Eurocontrol Meeting

SKYbrary Content Meeting – Eurocontrol Meeting – 20 February 2009
CE Meeting Summary

Agenda

Introduction

  • Eurocontrol (EC) is under going organisational change to become more transparent
  • Matrix management is being introduced with centre of expertise to be hired out to programme managers at a cost for personnel and time
  • Outcome will be a pooling of the 3 directorates expertise together

SKYBRARY(SB) Strategic Progress

  • Review of SB in 2008
    • SB Launch in 2008 with EC and FSF founder partners – UKFSC joined 4 months later
    • Aim to capture 70% of aviation knowledge globally in 3 years and be the Single point of reference for aviation safety knowledge
  • But need to avoid website duplication – use links to work already underway.

Way ahead

  • Build an active network of support across the industry
  • Content development – aim for self-generating contributor inputs within 3 years
  • Add value through partnership – ICAO,FSF,UKFSC,
  • Position of SB in EC Priority list: SB will be a keystone in EC future:
    • ANSP Directors of Ops now have safety on their agenda
    • ANSP safety managers are not well connectedinto OPS at the moment
    • Closer ties needed to make changes in Ops more quickly through improved safety case standards and common checklists and safety cases to carried in SB to address this issue.
  • Branding development
    • What uses is Skybrary being put to – are there others?
    • FSF is developing an ‘HF in aviation paper’ to be published in Skybrary – Airbus have also done a lot on HF over the past 6 years
  • Innovation and Design.
    • Retain the contemporary look and feel
    • SB will be an EC priority going forward – it is the world’s window into EC – therefore SB future is secure for next 4 years
    • ICAO is an SB stakeholder and personnel changes underway which EC must connect into.
    • FSF secondment position into EC is being considered for SB purposes

Partnership Value – What can partners bring to SB

  • Resources – not just cash
  • Promotion
  • Contribution
  • Content editorial
  • Expert input and advice

Partnership Activity- What should EC be doing?

  • Seek partner input into the Strategic Development plan for Skybrary
  • Consider the criteria for partnership – primary aim must be aviation safety promotion and not trade body interests
    • This will be considered in the Strat Plan review on which current partners will be consulted.

ContentDevelopment

  • New communication techniques video on Skybrary – ‘ Join and hold’
  • An SB promotion video is on U-tube!
  • Twitter account for Skybrary
  • Share Linked–In accounts with SB staff
  • Sharpen the strap line – ‘The single point of reference for aviation safety knowledge’

Other Developments

  • Exposure of SB internally at EC is important
    • U-tube video should be widely shown at all opportunity
    • External general aviation get -togethers in Europe are being targeted by SB
    • Infringements is one safety example being addressed in this way
  • Posters to push SB, plus other related safety messages. CE UKFSC offered to publish posters in the FOCUS
  • Survey on the SB user background to be undertaken at EC
  • A need to draw more expertise into the site who can comment on validate or challenge SB articles or add value to them – through a discussion forum?.
    • An open invite to readers to respond to issues and articles raised appears not to be working at this stage- but leave for now.
    • Seek other ways to illicit expert views on articles
  • Visit hits to be monitored and targets set for hits into the future
  • Bounce rates at 20% – ie those that stay on the site beyond a single article read. Potential to increase this rate – ie keep people longer
  • Push a monthly email out on new additions and changes to the site

Content Objectives- Contents Development Plan

  • 70% of subject area coverage
    • ContentDevelopment Plan completion rates discussed
      • The CDP rates are subjective but seek to identify base coverage of the subject
      • By Feb 09, around halfway to the targets for the Operational issues section has been achieved
      • Seek views on each section as to whether the issue has reached the core/base level
      • Aim to reach 100% coverage on each item in the Operational issues section by Jul 09.

Issues

  • Display of logos – how should this be done – 2 levels discussed -sponsors and supporters based on safety organisations and commercial organisations
  • Integration of materials from other organisations-how to achieve it?
    • Include a description of the organisation and link to its website, plus allow posting of specific policy positions on safety issues on SB site
  • Careful approach needed from SB when seeking to advise on commercial products. Some modelling needs to be done on this sensitive issue to ensure SB integrity is retained
  • Safety Alerts – sorting and visualisation for EC Safety alerts needs more presentational work
  • Internal links in the body of an article on SB – to link into SB info only– not to external sites to retain readers on the site. Only ‘In further reading’ can links be into external websites.
  • Collective partnership endorsement of a view expressed in an article should not be assumed. Some form of online statement, either on the landing page or at the end of each article is required to highlight this policy.
  • Provide FOCUS on pdf to Skybrary for publishing-plus FOCUS articles listings
  • Airline Safety investigator survey – Ed Pooley will provide for UKFSC CE to use for his own reference

Rich Jones
Chief Executive
UKFSC

SSM – SID Amended Climb – 30th January 2009 – Gatwick Meeting

SID Amended Climb Meeting – CAA Aviation House Gatwick – 30 January 2009
CE Meeting Summary

ITEM 1 – Introduction

  • The meeting was chaired by ATSD (Chris Peart) and comprised representatives from CAA Flt Ops and Policy Divisions, NATS policy and operations, major airline reps and CE UKFSC.

ITEM 2 – History

  • The history of the issue was covered from its initial ICAO origins in 2003, through Eurocontrol workshops to the current ICAO policy.
  •  UK involvement was also covered. In effect, the ATSD in the CAA had challenged the ICAO policy throughout its gestation on safety grounds but lacked any support from other States, who have implemented the policy as directed by ICAO.
  • The ICAO policy was implemented in Dec 2007 at which time the CA issued an ATSIN Notice to UK ANSPs and implemented specific phraseology which attempted to address UK safety concerns with the ICAO policy.
  • In Jan 2008, the CAA commenced work to resolve the safety concerns with ICAO.

Initial CAA Risk Assessment

  • A review of the errors which could arise from the ICAO policy concluded:

    • An underfly of the SID – leading to level bust
    • An overfly of the SID – leading to level bust
    • A delayed climb – considered least critical
    • An early climb – leading to level bust
    • Excessive RT

UK Steps

  • Options considered:
    • Continue as per pre-ATSIN – the UK – non ICAO climb
    • Follow ATSIN phraseology
    • Adopt ICAO
    • Adopt ICAO with amended phraseology plus additional ATC guidance

Procedures in Other States

  • All other States in Europe are following ICAO
  • ICAO will not change
  • IFALPA accept ICAO – they want a global standard

Discussion

  • Several operators state that the European States are not compliant with ICAO on SIDs and STARs at the working level.
  • To achieve ICAO compliance safely, SIDs will require a significant increase in RT particularly in the London Terminal Area.
  • Nonetheless, the forum concluded that, regardless of a disregard for the ICAO procedure at the working level in Europe, the UK must adopt the ICAO standard.

ITEM 3/4 – Overseas Impact

  • All States overseas have adopted ICAO, so that is what UK pilots must be prepared for. – ie, if they are given a climb whilst flying a SID, they should only climb to the new level at the end of the SID.
  • The operators’ experience around the table concluded that many European and US pilots do not fully understand the requirements of the ICAO procedure and believe that they can climb on immediate receipt of a new level clearance without a formal cancellation of the SID level restriction by ATC.
  • The conditional clearance option adopted by the UK ATSIN will be removed from the ATC tool box.
  • IN all cases, if in doubt, seek clarification from ATC!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Next Steps

  • In future, the UK ANSPs will no longer issue conditional clearances during SIDs. Level changes instructions within a SID procedure will only be issued after an explicit SID Level restriction cancellation has been made.
  • The ATSIN will be re-written by mid Feb 09, selected airline and ANSP operators will be asked to comment and the final version issued by the CAA in April 09 along with a supporting FODCOM.
  • The ATSIN and FODCOM will include clear examples.

ITEM 5- Major Decisions

  • The UK will adopt the current ICAO Pan ATM.
  • During SIDs, climb level instructions will not be issued in the UK.
  • Climb level instructions can only be undertaken after an explicit SID level cancellation has been issued.
  • Expect standard ICAO phraseology from UK ATC.
  • Clear unambiguous phraseology to be used.
  • If in doubt, crews should always confirm the instruction and also should question non-ICAO instructions.
  • April 2009 target for implementation.

Rich Jones
Chief Exec
UKFSC
30 January 2009

TCN Airspace Proposal – 8 April 2008 – NATS Swanwick Meeting

TCN Airspace Proposal – 8 April 2009NATS Swanwick
CE Meeting Summary

Presenter – Steve Patterson – Airspace Design- NATS TCN North Project Lead

Meeting consisted of a High Level briefing – not full detail due to complexity of the airspace

NATS Reasons Recap

  • Safety review by NATS in 2004 highlighted several issues with ESSEX Radar hold
    • Deconflict needed Stansted CPT and Poton SIDs for rw 05
    • Dedicated hold for Luton
    • Deconflict Stansted rw 05 RMA
  • Intro PRNav environment

Problems with Original Proposals

  • Flyability
    • Original design in 2008 was unflyable in certain met conditions
    • Holds were unsuitable for some aircraft
    • Increase capacity by 27%
  • Consultation issues
    • Numerous (15000) but largely based around noise
    • Livestock industry at Newmarket
    • Maintain existing departure routes
  • New Design
    • Holds remain in place from Consultation 1
    • Military requirement remains disallowing holds moving north
    • Stansted TMZ is not affected by this proposal at this stage
  • Two examples – Stansted and Luton – used to demonstrate the constraints and advantages behind the detailed proposal
    • Luton hold includes a potentially large protected area for non-PRNav aircraft- but plan not to take up more controlled airspace but to use positive radar control
    • Debate about the possibility of TA change. CAA are looking at 10000ft whilst most airlines are looking for 18000ft
  • Stakeholder Engagement
    • MOD updated on 25 March 2009
    • DAP/SRG briefed on 31 March 09
    • NATMAC briefed 8 April 2009
  • Simulation
    • Developmental 21 – 26 April
    • Validation 9 -14 May
  • Visitor days
    • 12 May – CAA/MOD/SRG
    • 13 May – Airlines/NSL/Airport Authorities/ANSPs/CAA/ATS TUs
      • 1430 – 1700 NATMAC invited.

Contact Steve Patterson @NATS

Detailed MAP Discussion – confidential release

  • GA Transit routings through TCN airspace are being addressed
  • 30 April meeting at LHR to discuss the SIDs from LHR, reference the transition altitude at 6000’ at BPK
  • Focus Group from interested GA organisation will form after the simulations to look at the proposal before it goes out on the next public consultation round
  • Request for recommended GA routes through the airspace for GA pilots to use. GA Reps will provide examples of routes to NATS after simulation
  • Look at local arrangements where airports when using a specific RW allow airspace to made available to other users – local clubs etc

Rich Jones
UKFSC
8 April 2009

RAeS FOG Meeting – 28 October 2009 – London Meeting


RAeS Flight Operations Group (FOG) Meeting–Hamilton Place, London-28 October 2009
CE Meeting Summary

FAA Automation Working Group Review- Kathy Abbott – FAA

The initial findings of the Automation Working Group Review by Kathy Abbot, which is looking at the pilot preparation for and the impact of automation in commercial aviation cockpits, are summarised in the CE’s External Meeting Report on the FAST Meeting held in Aug 2009 and posted on the UKFSC website.

Kathy Abbot provided the FOG with an updated version of this presentation. The key issues and findings are:

Introduction – Study Data Sources

  • Training for aircraft flight path management is at the centre of the study
  • This new study is based on analysis of data from aviation accidents and incidents that have occurred since 2001
    • 734 incidents have been analysed from  ASAP and ASRS voluntary reports
    • 42 accidents worldwide using professional reports
    • 9300+ LOSA observer reports
    • Multiple data and from worldwide sources
    • Interviews with pilots and manufacturers
      • Hindsight  bias is a strong player in interviews and was taken into account
  • Key data has only been taken from the ‘pilot slice’ of information

Threats and Factors

  • Operator-related threats have been identified and judged as factors in the accident. For example:
    • 40% of accidents involved an ac malfunction, often only minor
    • 20% of incidents had an ac malfunction
  • Other threats included Company policy and procedures/manuals and charts
  • Environmental threats were included, such as adverse weather
  • Crew-related threats included:
    • Inadequate knowledge – 35% of all accidents but only 8% incidents
    • FMS/SOP/Mode confusion/systems knowledge
    • CRM issues
    • Unusual attitude recognition and recovery
    • Speed and energy management
    • Ops into uncontrolled airspace and airfields
    • Communication errors
      • Pilot to pilot
    • Handling errors
      • Manual handing/flight controls in 50% accident
      • FMC Programming – 42%
  • Levels of automation misunderstandings, such as
    • Manual to automation transition -35%
    • Automation use leading to slow pilot response -32%
  • Undesired ac states
    • Lateral track error in 58% of incidents
    • Vertical deviation is 30% of accidents
  • Procedural Issues
    • SOP cross verification
  • Failure related issues
    • Failure modes not anticipated by ac designer
    • Insufficient check list availability to address every failure
  • Crew Co-ord problems
    • Task management
    • Cross checking
  • Company Procedures Issues
    • Lack of Company automation policies – 30% accidents
  • Fatigue – 8% of incidents
  • Other crew related threats, such as lack of situation awareness, in 25% of incidents

Preliminary Findings

  • Automation contributes to safety significantly
  • Significant improvement in safety data availability
  • Changes in pilot demographics
  • Manual flying skills levels
  • Changes in management of flight paths
    • Autothrottle
    • Autopilot
  • Mis-programming of FMS
  • Inadequate pilot knowledge
  • Regulatory standards are out of date
  • Minimum training provided
  • Changes in airspace procedures
  • Pilots will not say ‘unable’
  • Economic pressures
  • Equipment design and differences
    • Complexity of the flight crew interaction and interface
  • Flight Crew procedures
  • Operator automation policy
  • Trade-off between flexibility and complexity
  • Safety data collection and analysis
    • Data source has strengths and weaknesses
    • Precursors and accidents is complex
  • Basic airmanship – what does this mean?
  • Role of liability
    • Resistance to discuss design vulnerability
    • Use of manufacturer checklist and trg
    • Choice of responsibility and op policies
    • Reluctance to report safety events
  • What next – Final Report to be delivered early next year

Rich Jones
Chief Exec
UK Flight Safety Committee
12 December 2009

RETRE Conference – 17/18 November 2009 – Uckfield Meeting

CAA Revalidating Examiner of Type Rating Examiners (RETRE) Conference
Uckfield- 17/18 November 2009
CE Meeting Summary

Agenda

  • The THREAT Presentation by Joji Waites provided the background to the Safety Performance Indicator work and the analysis which resulted in the formation of the CAA Seven Significant Safety Task Forces (TF).Full Presentation

NB. The UKFSC CE attended Day 1 only. Day 2 was a closed session for RETREs only

Rich Jones
Chief Exec
UKFSC
14 December 2009

EASA Pilot Training Conference – 24 November 2009 – Cologne Meeting

EASA Pilot Training Conference – Cologne – 24 November 2009
CE Conference Summary



The Agenda

Key Note Address – Patrick Goudou – EASA Exec Director

  • The Buffalo accident may well have highlighted an important pilot trg problem
  • Pilot performance is a key factor in accidents and incidents and indicates that continuous improvement in pilot training is required.
  • Increasing concerns with pilot performance resulted in EASA calling this conference
  • Better training in basic flying skills will need to be addressed.

Key Note Address – John Allen – FAA Director Flight Standards

  • It is imperative that pilot performance is improved
  • Pilot experience, time and hours do not indicate better judgement
  • Buffalo/Colgan and the Pinnacle accidents indicate a problem with pilot professional capabilities
  • Overfly of destination by a crew earlier this year is another serious indicator
  • Prescriptive trg does not work – performance trg is required. Pilot ‘Thinkers’ are required, not ‘Robots’.
  • We need to focus on judgement which requires appropriate attitude and airmanship development
  • Trg has not caught up with the current situation in industry –and we need to train based on today’s risks and priorities
  • Continuous mentoring by the Captain must be a given – on every trip
  • Professionalism must be promoted – it cannot be regulated.

Safety in Aviation – John Vincent – EASA

  • Aviation in Europe is relatively safe –- but it needs to continue to improve
  • In the last 3 years, 3 major European accidents have occurred – 2 x MD 80s and Air France
  • Stats and graphs from the EASA Safety Review show minimal improvement
  • Abnormal runway contact – ARC – is a significant input to accidents
  • LOC is the most significant – but training to counter it is a major factor
  • The UK CAA High Severity Occurrences Graph shows a worrying rise – is this also applicable across Europe?
  • Fatalities are another indicator – these appear to be climbing but are still below the average for the past 10 years
  • Colgan and Buffalo accidents offer a useful contrast in terms of outcome
  • Many safety recommendations received by EASA appear to identify trg shortfalls – which could be used to improve pilot trg.
    • These recs need to be addressed – but care is needed to ensure these are not addressed piecemeal
  • Difficult to measure what degree trg plays as a factor in accidents
  • Future risks and areas of change need to be measured for trg changes
  • Ways of improving safety include use of technology, raising standards, introduction of safety management systems and organisational changes to support safety promotion, assurance and risk management
  • Next steps – to combine reactive outcomes, data history analysis, current operational data and future risks to produce a comprehensive picture

Full Presentation

FAA Action Plan for Safety – John Duncan FAA

  • FAA has initiated a ‘Call to Action’ on safety and trg
  • Current challenges
    • Increasing need for more pilots
    • Numbers of mil pilots and experienced civil pilots is decreasing
    • Aim of action is to gather a consolidated approach from all parties
  •  Initiatives underway include:
    • Fatigue regulations to change – after no changes for over 40 years
      • A joint committee from the Regulator and Industry have been addressing the problem
    • Focused inspections on regional operators by the FAA
    • Promote professional standards and seek more pilot screening for background and experience
    • Numbers of flying hours do not demo the pilot skills needed – leadership and qualities are also very important
    • Total re-think on upgrade training is ongoing – re-current trg should start right from the beginning of every career pilot
    • Perception that regional operators do not operate to the same standards- hence focussed inspection
    • A survey has shown that 90% of carriers had SOPs for their operations, that 60% managed low-time pilots and 75% tracked poor individual pilot performance!
    • FAA guidance has been issued on what pilot background and trg knowledge should be established during the hiring process
    • FAA is seeking ASAP and FOQA data information from carriers
    • Discipline within the pilot cadre needs to be addressed
    • Mentoring is seen as a key missing link in the industry
      • No-one is quite sure what mentoring looks like at this stage
    • Upset trg changes have been identified – approach to stall and push stick trg changes in the pipeline
    • Additional pilot trg and qualifications will be required to before pilots join airlines
    • The application of the Advanced Qualifications Prog (AQP) based on evidence from occurrences within carriers is growing.
      • Trg needs to retain flexibility, be tailored – some cultural resistance
    • Congress Bill on pilot trg hours minimums coming in – 1500 hours?
    • The MPL will not be implemented but remains on the table at the FAA
    • Sim Trg- limitations still exist with today’s sims and CBTs

Full Presentation

Oversight For Quality In Trg – Ole Lynngaard, Danish CAA

  • Who is auditing who? ICAO, EASA, NAA.  Requirements set by EASA in the FCL and EASA STD – part 66.
  • ISO Audits – Internal audits are also underway in the industry
  • Effective Industry oversight requires a competent NAA
  • What is effective Oversight? Is it simply questioning each companies’ a system of risk management OR is it actual Oversight!!
  • Inspection – have we got a definition?
  • In Scandinavia – the move now is towards reviewing whether Quality/SMS checking should be the only indicator of competency in the industry.
  • There is an increasingly popular view that says we need to go deeper!!
  • Major challenge today in Danish NAA
    • Financial resources
    • Lack of tools
    • Authoritative inspection staff
    • Staff trg

Full Presentation

Competence – Performance – Airmanship – Fransisco Hoyas – ECA

  • How to get these skills and then keep them?
  • Pilot trg flying requirements are down by 500%, not inc sims!
    • In 1979 – 19 flts and 76 hours needed for DC9 trg – in 2009 pilots only need 20 sims!
  • Pilot trg is now ‘one size fits all’
  • We need to change pilot trg to be competency-based
  • Competence = knowledge, skill and ability and attitude
    • Knowledge means practical application of knowledge and the experience to deliver it
  • Flying is not like learning to ride a bike, it also requires recurrency practice
    • Piloting skills mean unconscious execution of trained skills
  • Special attention is required to LOC/recoveries
  • Pilot trg requires high standards, effective selection, best possible trg devices and structured trg
  • How do we measure Competency Abilities?
    • Attitude assessment needed at the pre-selection point, not later
  • Airmanship covers all aspects of flying
    • Good judgement
    • Art of flying and navigation
  • How to get Airmanship
    • On the Job Trg
    • Experience
    • Mentoring
    • Lessons learnt
  • Aims of recurrent trg
    • Ac handling
    • Practice essential procedures
    • Use of emergency procedures and equipment
  • Improvement is required in data and information sharing

Full Presentation

Ab Initio Trg- For The Future – Dirk Kroger, Lufthansa

  • Basic requirements are:
    • Technical competence
    • Procedural understanding
    • Crew/human interpersonal
  • Selection is not regulated
    • Until recently, pilot training has relied on the following sequence: -CPL/IR/MCC/Bridge course(Non-reg)/type rating/OJT
  • New Lufthansa approach
    • “2 step selection process based on basic quals and company requirements. This reduces the applications to 7-10% successful
    • In subsequent trg,  95% are successful getting to the front line
  • Evolution from ATPL to MPL
    • ATPL 176 hours flying trg – MPL 70 hours (basic MPL is 40)
    • MPL Core flying can be reduced since little is gained after 46 hours on basic ac
    • However, a jet orientation course has been added to increase the learning curve and therefore the value
  • Conclusions to improve pilot trg the following is needed:
    • Stringent selection
    • Personality check
    • Aptitudes check
    • Well-balanced trg in all competency areas

Full Presentation

Beyond Flight Simulation – Steve Sheterline, BA

  • Simply ticking the regulatory boxes for pilot trg does not ensure competency
  • Trg should be based on evidence based and risk assessed outcomes
  • An example of this approach using root cause analysis on Overruns
  • Of 554 accidents, 154 (28%) have been overruns in which 480 killed. The major causal factors are:
    • De-stabilised approach
    • Deep landing are done for other reasons – rw perspective
    • Wx, including runways surface with insufficient knowledge/info being made available
    • Mishandling of retard devices
  • Specific incident used as an example: a near overrun incident at Milan.
    •  The internal inquiry revealed that:
    • The crew mindset – committed to land too early
    • No regular trg or practice of go-round practice
    • Work Overload- no capacity for sound decision-making
    • Insufficient Confidence
  • Training mitigations resulting
    • Raise crew awareness – mindset, threat, identification, error management
    • Integrate human factors into mindset, decision making, capacity
    • Expectation change to routinely prepare for a go round from the runway
    • Sim trg – overrun pre-conditions, low go-around, baulked landing practice
  • ATQP offers this opportunity without additional training time – replaces LPC in the cycle
    • Op and technical trg
    • Leadership and management
    • Situation awareness
    • Teamworking
    • Decision making
  • Summary
    • Trg decisions should be risk based and data driven
    • Root cause analysis of accidents and incidents needs to undertaken
    • Flexibility needed from the regulators to encourage ATQP
    • More trg does not mean better trg
    • Avoid impossible trg!
    • Why is ATQP not in the EASA requirement?

Full Presentation

Basic Flying and the Modern Pilot – Tanja Harter, IFALPA

  • All ac have wings and operate to the same basic aerodynamic rules
  • Flying involves highly dynamic and complex scenarios. Factors include:
    • Handling errors
    • Tech failures
    • Wx
    • Limits of automation
    • All of the above
  • We can’t train for everything!
  • How do we manage the problems? We must aviate, navigate, communicate
    •  Select the correct parameters for safe flying
    • Be capable of manually flying the aircraft
    • Always be prepared to step in and take over from the automatics
  • Basic flying skills
    • Selection
    • Training – needs time and consolidation
    • Basic stick and rudder trg
    • TO, landing, approaches
    • Basic co-ord
  • Basic Knowledge
    • Aerodynamic principles
    • Ac systems basics
    • Wx
  • Basic Back Up
    • Other automation modes
    • Pitch and power values
    • Fallback options – hi-lo key, raw data
  • Conclusions
    • Thorough coverage of basic flying skills in initial trg is still essential
    • Recurrency basic flying skill trg is essential
    • Sufficient flying in real ac is vital
    • Good simulators
    • Proper trg and selected personnel
    • We fly real ac not sims

Full Presentation
Are Sims The Answer – Werner Maas, Lufthansa

  •  Pilot Selection is vital!
  • MPL is important new tool
  • LOC is the key danger – trg is required to address this
  • Sims cannot do upset recovery sufficiently accurate enough in motion terns
    • Incapable of providing the psychological effects – stress, fear perception and confidence
    • Incapable of replicating the environment- realistic ATC, climate, cabin and pax responsibilities
  • Lufthansa is now undertaking Joint Sim trg – 5 sims interconnected with ATC controllers to better simulate the complexity of the real world

Full Presentation

Upset Prevention Trg– Jaques Drappier, Airbus

  • Recent accidents resulting in lots of LOC talk around the Safety and Ops Depts in the industry
  • Are these accidents due to LOC or loss of situational awareness?
  • Airbus is proud of the LOC prevention it has achieved
  • Analysis of the root cause of aircraft upset demonstrates that:
    • Recognition and prevention are the key stoppers of LOC and these must break down before an upset can occur
    • Pilot knowledge skills and attitude are needed to prevent upset
    • It is much better to avoid or recover early from upsets
    • It is vital that negative trg is avoided –  which was a key finding from the American Airlines Airbus accident off New York – breaking tail off!
  • Airbus does not support the use of full flight sim for upset trg
    • Outside established envelope negative trg occurs
  • Loss of situational awareness will not be corrected by LOC recovery trg
  • Wake encounter is not LOC – so Airbus policy is to leave the ac to sort itself out
  • Airbus policy on LOC is as follows:
    • Train up a clear understanding of the principles of ac upset and how to avoid these situations
    • URTrg is to be encouraged in the context of pre-upset awareness trg but not in the context of post upset
    • Academic trg must be provided on basic flying techniques
  • Airbus has now introduced jet entry level trg for use with ab initio and turboprop cross over pilots
  • Airbus recommends the FAA Upset trg video (available through the UKFSC website)
  • Recurrent trg – pilots have forgotten the basic power and pitch trg since the advent of autopilot
  • In any upset situation, do not overeat and act smoothly on the controls
  • Do not disengage the automatics unless you know it is a system problem
  • Create an upset pre-cursor identification and  avoidance culture, rather than recovery attitude

Full Presentation

Pilot Trg, Departing from the Script– Chuck Hogeman, ALPA

  • In Human Factors trg terms, we have seen 5 variations of CRM since the 1980s with Threat and Error Management being the latest
  • CRM now includes flight attendants, engineers and dispatchers
  • Need to agree terminology for CRM training and HF and to define SOPs and specific skills
  • Competency based trg should include the Application to TEM/CRM
    • ATQP and AQP offers the opportunity since they take a detailed analysis and performance based approach
    • There is value in exploiting Instructional systems design and involving  experts in the development of trg
    • Useful to establish a gold standard for technical performance
    • Calibrated standard for instructors – who are able to judge pilot performance
    • Sensitive grading scale is needed for evaluators to apply which can identify the low performing pilot
    • Through data and information collection from de-identified LOSA/ASAP/FOQA, we can learn the lessons from others
  • Training Low Experience Pilots – how?
    • Those pilots who are learning in 2 or more of the following environments simultaneously – ac type/ new airline/ new captain – are classified as low experience
    • We need to be able to ‘train to develop experience’
    • We need to understand the trg learning curve and cover safety concerns in simulators before consolidating it in line trg
  • We can train motor skills, technical aircraft systems and CRM
  • We cannot train personal responsibility, professionalism and a sense of self improvement
    • These qualities need to be selected by those wishing to enter pilot training.
  • Current trg methods need to improve and not be invented anew.
  • Changes to regulations and standards need to use scientific approach

Full Presentation

Training for Competence – Dieter Harms, ITQI IATA
Full Presentation to follow

Training and Automation Dependency – David McCorquodale , CAA
Full Presentation

Rich Jones
Chief Exec
UK Flight Safety Committee
11 December 2009

CAA Volcano Ash Contingency Conference – 13 May 2010 – London Meeting

CAA Volcano Ash Contingency Conference- Grand Connaught Rooms, London – 13 May 2010
CE Meeting Summary

The Agenda

Sue Loughlin – British Geological Survey

Volcano Characteristics

  • The Volcano and Iceland – It is relatively small but part of a larger system
  • It is ice filled and 2.5km across.
  • End of March 10 – eruption was predicted from the seismological data
  • Phase 1 – Lava flows and lava fountains from the flank of the ice cap
  • Phase 2- Erupt from the volcano cap itself. With ice at the cap, ice melts and magma and water causes the plumes and explosions
  • This then creates steam and ash in pulses
  • Steam generation causes serious explosions with more fine ash resulting
  • Phase 3 – ice then melts – but gas pressure sends out more ash but greater size particles as well as fine ash
  • Aggregation takes places and ash conglomerates near the mouth of the volcano – this may take 4 months to stop
  • Four eruptions in the past 1500 years – but the larger volcano alongside – Katla, is thought likely to kick off
  • 30 volcanos in Iceland- 2.5 eruptions per year
  • Peak of activity is starting in Iceland now after a trough in past 100 years
  • The real problem for aviation starts when this combines with the weather
  • Montserrat – discrete and last a few minutes – 14 km plume
  • Pinatubo 1991 – big but a single explosion – 34 km plume
  • Way ahead
    • More research!
    • Improve plume particle distribution
    • Better data to improve the model
    • Remote sensing for particle sizing and plotting

Steve Mobbs – Environmental Research Council – Met Office

What is in the plume and how do we know?

  • 16 Apr 10- Dornier launch to investigate the plume make-up
  • LIDAR instrument used to look up at the cloud make-up
  • 100 – 300 microgrammes per cubic metre were detected
  • A wide range of particle sizes were found (some doubt about the measure technique)
  • BAe146 was then deployed – with a downward looking LIDAR – v small particle levels were detected
  • The manufacturers published 25 mgr per m3 as the maximum as the acceptable aviation level
  • Dornier may have engine problems and is being examined as a precaution– potentially some corrosion due to sulphur dioxide concentrations
  • Outcomes
    • Aerosols from particle counters using the LIDAR
    • Trace gases including sulpur dioxide
    • Radiation
    • Standard met and thermodynamics
    • 400 mg per m3 were detected by the BAe instrumentation
    • Carbon monoxide has also been found in certain areas
    • Ash layers exist in fine structures
    • Balloon sondes have found 300 mg concentrations
  • Conclusions – detection levels depend on:
    • Variation in time of emissions
    • Distance from source
    • Altitude
    • Volcanic trace gases
      • SO2 (and CO)
      • Effect on engines
      • Smells disturbing passengers
    • Electrostatic effects
      • Alarming passengers

Forecasting Ash Cloud – Julia Slingo Met Office

  • The process draws together vast amounts of atmospheric data from several sources which is modelled and then progressed forward for the forecast
  • Effects of rainfall, boundary layers and winds on ash are also included
  • The Met Office is a world leader in quality of forecasting
  • VAAC charts are then produced – using the NAME model
  • The model has a proven record when used during specific events
    • Continuous eruptions are different to individual bursts
  • Comparison of models
    • UK, France, Canadian are very similar in make-up and prediction
    • Ash can be airborne for 5 days, via circulation by the atmosphere
    • This model does not give you the precise concentration of ash, just that it is present
    • Vertical structure maps currently 0-FL 200 and FL 200 and above – may change to 5000 layers of ash.
    • SO2 problem cannot be ignored- a model can show ash and SO2 discrimination

Questions From the Floor

1.Can you see ash and therefore avoid it?

  • It all depends on the viewing angle and the concentration. This needs more work
  • NAME model is successful in capturing the horizontal extent of the ash
  • LIDAR has limited utility
  • Forecasting can provide other services and products – you need to tell the Met Office what you need
  • Improving data helps future accuracy
  • Real time volcanic source calibration is being looked at
  • It’s an unusual volcano; not the standard pattern of emissions and weather conditions and patterns are more difficult to predict in this region and season
  • Katla will emit 20 times greater amounts of ash, if it happens
  • Particle sizing is a key issue to be gripped
  • Airbus are seeking to allow more risk to be taken by flying aircraft into the ash cloud area and then get a rapid data dump to check out the effects on engines
  • Airbus will be flying test flights this week to supplement the data

2.What about past volcanic incidents?

  • Pinnatubu – provided useful data which could be revisited to offer more data
  • All past ash events do need to be analysed as soon as possible

3.The WSI model is an alternative model and shows different results. Why?

a.The US WSI is being consulted and co-ordination will be considered asap

b.The WSI model only shows new ash only, not cumulative

4.Boeing believe the AME model was over predicting the ash concentration than that being detected by the airborne testing showed. Comment?

a.It is possible – more testing of the model will help to clarify this issue – but the model seems fairly accurate from past results.

5.Honeywell Comment – we will tear the Dornier engine and release the data in due course

  • 500MG WAS flown through – engine strip is precautionary

6.BA question the model and seek further justification of it and made the following statement:

a.14000 flights has shown no detrimental effect to its ac

b.Let’s stick with volcanic ash – not SO2, as a problem in safety terms. Ash is only an engine issue which the manufacturers need to deal with

7.Have you consulted Fred Prata?

  • The Prata system can detect the volcanic ash levels in an airborne system and is known to easyJet and Airbus; and is being investigated

8.Limited airborne resources seem to be a problem– are we seeking further support from other aviation assets globally?

  • There is some work being done but this is proving slow – satellite and lidar is still invaluable

9.Has there been any measurement of particles in the Atlantic region to confirm the model

  • Work is on going in the UK
  • US has offered ac but these are very conditional offers and have not been taken up so far

10.Helicopter requirements are for lower level ash forecasting than the current forecasting is providing.

Pahdraic Kelleher – CAA Head of Airworthiness

Work to date on establishing the impact of ash on aircraft

  • Has centred on the threat to ac engine and airframes
  • Known encounters to date show 2000 in the past three weeks
  • 3 well known past incidents – 2 x 747 in 1982 plus KLM in Alaska in 1989
  • Work on the 1982 incident is underway to identify the ash concentrations between manufacturers and the Met Office
  • Engines, probes, static holes are worst affected – with engines being the most critical
  • Military reports shows major engine effects have occurred and quickly
  • CAA no fly zone is ash levels of 2×10-3g/m3 based on the OEM tolerance  with 2×10-4g/m3 being the enhanced safety zone procedure
  • Airbus 340-600 flight test is looking at the problem and will operate into the UK next
  • What next?
    • Certification standards exist for birds and water, but not ash
      • Ash certs may well follow in due course
    • Big volcano ash encounters will happen in future, therefore action is necessary
    • Establish some form of ash level management

Andrew Haines CAA CEO

Where we go next?

  • This is an urgent and long term issue
  • Results from a combination of this volcano, the weather and congested airspace
  • We need a robust model and sufficient validation to confirm ash is present
  • The current situation of simply seeking co-operation from the manufacturers to open the skies is unsustainable
  • The shared goal is to minimise disruption without comprising safety
  • Pan European approach needed
  • Current arrangements are not sacrosanct
  • Public needs re-assurance of safety in these circumstances
  • Incremental steps in policy have been taken as the situation becomes better understood
  • Current policy was rapidly developed over a short time – 5 days
    • Logical approach based on a very low level of risk
    • Conservative approach is understandable
    • Cumulative effects on engines not fully understood or predictable currently
  • The next move is more difficult to agree and risk still exists
    • Lack of risk assessment under these conditions
  • Member states should have a single agreed approach
    • UK and Ireland are more exposed economically
  • Airworthiness work must be fast tracked

Moving Forward

  • Volcanic ash will continue to impact UK and Atlantic
  • Work to be addressed:
    • Further refine the ash cloud zones
    • Seek 2×10-2 g/m3 from the OEMs
    • Establish criteria to operate within the ash boundary
    • Risk measured by the amount of ash that accumulates in the engine – met office can establish this measurement
    • Need to define ‘safe’ – trade off between commercial decisions and maintenance penalty
    • Learn how risk can be best managed and by whom
    • Combination of enhanced op procedure and revised airworthiness parameters form the basis of potentially make safe progress
    • Creation of TF to pursue this – OEMs, operations, ANSP, Met Office
    • CAA willing to act as facilitator on behalf of EASA – to meet the timescale of the ICAO Conference to discuss the matter in Jun 2010

Conclusion

  • Risk remains and consequences are severe
  • Focus on the issues will be key

Questions

1.Are we going to ask pilots and operators to do the risk assessment rather than the ANSPs?

  • CAA support the risk assessment and a move to operators but this will require common guidelines
  • More detailed forecasting will help open the airspace in line with the guidance to be developed by the TF in due course
  • CAA DAP are producing typical products but airlines need to check the validity of these articles
  • The Info will be issued every 3 hours by Eurocontrol to ANSP
  • The EU has called a pan European meeting next Monday to discuss a common solution

2.Rolls Royce – The reduction of ash level is understood but the ash concentration is uncertain so how do you make sure the safe boundary?

  • No clear answer to this at this stage – other than aircraft trials are being attempted

3.Encounters reports are being raised – but only a very few are actually within 10-3 range below the risk of activities

  • Odours and ash encounters have been noted but that is all – the red zone therefore is seen as effective

4.Request for a single chart for operators – Met , Eurocontrol, CAA all issue charts that are different?

  • Use the CAA co-ordinates as the single source – these will be certified next week and issued with software to make it user friendly

5.Request by Airbus that the instruments to check the model should be provided to them asap!

  • A package of instruments is close to being produced by the Met Office
  • Pitot statics are not showing any effects so far

6.The AEA has lost confidence in the London VAAC. Are we seeking other models to validate these parameters?

  • Other models will be reviewed by the Govt Scientist team – met and volcanology will be consulted

Rich Jones
Chief Exec
UK Flight Safety Committee

CAA Aerodrom Winter Wash Up Meeting – 12 July 2010 – Gatwick Meeting

CAA Winter Aerodrome Operations Wash Up Meeting 2 – 12 July 2010 – SRG CAA Gatwick

CE Meeting Summary

Agenda

INTRODUCTION

  • This meeting resulted from the initial CAA Winter Wash-Up meeting held on 5 May 10. Meeting Notes are attached.
  • One aim is to review work in EASA, FAA and ICAO on surface friction measurement and reporting
  • CAA aim will be to produce a FODCOM, an ATSIN and NOTAL which advises on winter operations in sufficient time for next winter.
  • A Govt enquiry into resilience of airport operations is also underway
  • Future work will be generated by pulling advice together within the Winter Operations meeting delegates

CURRENT POLICY ON PASSING FRICTION DATA TO FLIGHT CREW

  • ICAO, AIP AD General, MATS Part 1 CAP493, CAP168 & EU Ops all address runay friction measurement and reporting
  • The CAA perception is that there is a lack of consistency and confidence in mu readings, which the manufacturer rep denied at the meeting
    • As a result, the CAA do not allow airports to transmit the mu meter readings to aircraft wishing to approach and land at UK airports
  • This policy has been translated by the airports to mean that no information on runway conditions are passed to flightcrews, not even PIREPs
    • Expert advice from other pilots in PIREPs does offer value to decision making
  • January Edinburgh incident does demo the UK problem of rapidly changing weather –when a  similar ac under similar taxi pattern and instructions landing within 5 minutes of each other had different outcomes – a runway excursion
  • Birmingham airport undertake a series of inspections as the contamination builds in an attempt to identify more accurately the friction and contamination conditions
    • Pilots are also asked for braking action as the snow developed and this is reported to the next landing
  • Liability for the information provided is a concern for airports but the general view of the insurers that any relevant information should be passed in good faith rather than withheld in case of a subsequent incident or inaccuracy
  • It was pointed out that risk has to be assessed and managed for take-off and landing, with take-off being the higher
  • Manufacturers information is also key to identifying the right type of data and parameters that needs to be measured and passed to flight crew
  • The FAA TALPA ARC Code is being included in Metars from this winter in the US and at Munich
  • The temptation to devise local/national friction reporting methods must be resisted – a global solution is vital
  • Recommendation was to concentrate on TALPA ARC information as the basis on which to identify the data needed for friction reporting
  • The CAA issued the following Policy Decision
    • Mu meter readings will not be issued for the time being
    • UK Airlines using the TALPA ARC method will need to justify this to the CAA FOI and the CAA before they use it
    • CAA will consider the various documents on friction reporting and measurement and provide a clear policy
    • Pilots will continue to use the appropriate manufacturers tables
    • CAA will review the manufacturers tables and check the information required by each to ensure the aerodromes are providing the appropriate data

Individual Airport Reporting Policy

  • Highlands and Islands Airports
    • Working with Loganair to draw up a trg package together which gives contamination depths and types
    • PIREPs are not provided or passed on.
  • BAA
    • Depth and type of contaminant only is passed to the crews
    • Mu meter readings are taken for internal confidence, but not passed to crews
    •  PIREPs are available but their value is limited and rarely used
    • Width of runway is made available
  • Manchester
    • Same as BAA
    • Grip test run is done for confidence but not given out to crews
    • PIREPs are used but the reports need to be standardised
  • Scottish Airports plus Manston
    • As per BAA
    • All airports use mu meter readings for internal confidence but do not transmit them

Airline Operations

  • Ultimately, and assuming the airport is open, the Captain makes the decision to operate – take –off or land
  • Regardless, all ac must be clear of ice and frost (except hoar frost in certain areas and types)
  • De-icing standards, poor communication between flight crews and de-icing teams and the ability to undertake post de-icing inspections were major problems for airlines
  • Standardising information on airport conditions need to be provided before taxi
  • Lengthy discussion on the need for co-ordination between airports on closures during winter conditions. Although highly desirable, it is extremely difficult to fix

Airport Manoeuvre De-icing Issues

  • Operating area safety for ground staff, aircrew and passengers is a key issue and requires some significant work to achieve
  • Effective co-ordination and sensible resource sharing between all ground handling players in the airport is vital under these extreme conditions
  • An effective snow plan is also essential for the airport which must also include efficient co-ordination of all available resources
    • Those nominated to act in the plan need to willing to do so in the poor conditions otherwise the plan flounders very quickly
  • Getting rid of high volumes of snow is an important issue that needs to be addressed by several airports
    • Snow walls height limitations must be adhered to.

AOB

  • The meeting failed to address some significant de-icing/ant-icing co-ordination problems between flight crews and de-icing teams and the sharing of best practice
  • Sharing of best practice snow and ice plans and management can be achieved thorough manoeuvre/runway safety teams exchanges
  • DfT is looking at the wider resilience of the various stocks of de-icing and anti-icing that are vital to keep the airport operating
  • A small team of volunteers will be generated to undertake the work identified from this meeting

Rich Jones
Chief Exec
UKFSC
15 July 2010

Hazardous Laser Meeting – 3 December 2010 – London Meeting

Hazardous Laser Meeting – Home Office, London – 3 December 2010
CE Meeting Summary

Meeting Purpose and Agenda

Introductions and Involvement  from Attendees

  • DSTL – are looking at the effects of dazzle and light on the eye from high power light sources and developing eye protection
  • Neil King dstl is looking at military and civil targets for lasers and the technology behind the laser capability
  • Home Office – looking at lasers as offensive weapons and providing protection for police officers
  • Professor John Marshall – College of Ophthalmology laser safety expert
  • Police looking into criminal investigation into import of offensive weapons
  • Counter laser attack advice for police helicopters
  • Professor John O’Hagan – advisor to Govt Health and Home Office on lasers
  • National police advisor – looking at helicopter ops policy
  • Met Police advisor on airport security

Background to the Call for a Meeting

  • July 2010 – PSNI had laser attacks on water cannon
    • Trail on eye protection glasses underway with police – no recommendations yet
  • UK Border Agency are keen to know how to deal with high powered blue Spyder 3 lasers which they are intercepting in the mailing system
  • 27 Spyders have now been stopped on entry into the country
    • Although not classified as weapons, the purchasers are being investigated as to the reason for having them – by letter
    • As a result, 2 have been released to the public; rest are being withheld
    • The UKBA wish to know if they need licence for possession and whether to confiscate or what?
    • Some UKBA liaison with local police but no proper legislation
  • Apparently some 1000 Spyders are being shipped out from China per week globally

Other States Action

  • Australia banned the sale of laser devices after attacks on aircraft but this just increased the attacks due to the cache of owning a banned device
  • France ban possession of all lasers above Class 2 unless for professional use
  • From the police consultations with ATC, lasers are the greatest threat to ac
  • The police are attempting to pull together some accurate data on attack motives:
    • Many are opportunistic
    • There are some terrorists application potential

Possible Ways Forward

  •  APCO guidance is required to respond to laser attacks on aircraft consisting of:
    • An Initial response
    • A Reporting process – an evidence requirement pack is being developed
    • Solutions – police engaging with the CAA
  • In parallel, an awareness package for the public and the pilot community is under development
  • A Medical examination/study to establish the possible longer term damage would be helpful to substantiate the issue
    • The Laser Safety expert denied the possibility or likelihood of any lasting damage to pilots from these attacks – the laser is neither powerful enough nor close enough to have any lasting effect

Laser Pointer History

  • Need to put the risk into perspective – Govt first concerned in 1997 but these lasers were harmless due to a lack of power
  • Re-invigorated interest when the Spyder 3 laser appeared – an adaption from a Casio projector
  • These projectors were bought and dismantled by Wicked Lasers in Hong Kong
  • Goggles are provided with the Spyder laser but these are inadequate in protection terms
  • New design of this Spyder laser is now available through the US
  • If this laser were to be used for scientific purposes, it would require:
    • Significant training before safe use
    • A more complex and safer switch – now found on this new system
    • These Spyder lasers can burn and do eye significant damage
  • 0.8 watts of power available at the core, which then dissipates with distance
  • Normal Laser pointers emitting 10mw are not a safety issue, regardless of colour
  • 50-200mw is used to undertake eye surgery – at close range!
  • 750 watt laser – the Spyder – will do damage 70 meters
  • These coloured lasers can be seen by the naked eye, but an IR laser could be used which will not be seen by the human eye – but damage could occur
  • FAA has undertaken studies of lasers on pilots in a specialist simulator
  • Power is not the real key issue – the colour is!
  • No damage effects with low power green
  • A Spyder 3 in equivalent to about 50mw green laser in terms of effect

John Marshall – Professor in Ophthalmology – Laser safety Specialist

  • The public has a serious misconception about the power and dangers of lasers
    • James Bond has a lot to answer for!
  • His main concern is the misuse of laser in crowds at sporting events
  • 1000s examples of laser burns to the peripheral of the eye which are harmless and temporary
  • Only a very small area on the retina can suffer serious long lasting damage
  • About 50-100mw of power is needed to damage the retina – then it is irreparable
  • There are around 10 laser injuries incidents per year – no long lasting damage
  • There is a natural eye condition which looks similar to laser burn effects which are often misdiagnosed by non laser expert eye specialists
  • 500 mw laser can burn paper and cause combustion at close quarter
  • Retinal damage by laser does not have pain associated with it since there are no receptors
    • Only pain possible on the outer eyeball surface

Legislation

  • The meeting debated about legislation that could be put in place
  • With many legitimate reasons for possessing a laser, it is difficult to ban them since getting evidence on the owner’s intent is an issue
  • Under consumer act, only safe products are allowed on sale in the UK – this may be one route for legislative action
  • Sales over the internet are a problem to control
  • Action can only be taken if lasers are supplied from a UK source, or EC under certain circumstances
  • Trading standards state all lasers above Class 2 should not be available to the general public- only for professional use only
  • A view was expressed that Spyder lasers were a fad which will slowly disappear
    • These types of lasers would be too expensive to produce in the UK
  • Supply for Self use via the net is legally allowed
  • Only if gross numbers are imported can action could be taken

Protection

  • Laser protection sunglasses are available which cut out notched frequencies
  • Many are tinted for consumer reasons only – but need not be to be effective
  • Broad waveband goggles are ineffective

Conclusions

  • The Laser Experts believe there is no need for laser protection sunglasses for pilots since it is impossible to produce the power required close enough to the pilot’s eyes to cause any serious eye damage in the flight deck situation.
  • However, it was agreed that:
    • Laser attacks were causing psychological harm to pilots due to their fear of eye damage, although unfounded, and the subsequent potential for loss of earnings or career
    • Distraction of pilots particularly during take-off and landing phases was a serious safety issue
  • Another meeting would be held in April to review the latest position

Rich Jones
Chief Exec
UK Flight safety Committee
17 December 2011

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